Retrieval monitoring enhances episodic memory accuracy. For instance, false recognition is reduced when participants base their decisions on more distinctive recollections, a retrieval monitoring process called the distinctiveness heuristic. The experiments reported here tested the hypothesis that autobiographical elaboration during study (i.e., generating autobiographical memories in response to cue words) would lead to more distinctive recollections than other item-specific encoding tasks, enhancing retrieval monitoring accuracy at test. Consistent with this hypothesis, false recognition was less likely when participants had to search their memory for previous autobiographical elaborations, compared to previous semantic judgments. These false recognition effects were dissociated from true recognition effects across four experiments, implicating a recollection-based monitoring process that was independent from familiarity-based processes. Separately obtained subjective measures provided converging evidence for this conclusion. The cognitive operations engaged during autobiographical elaboration can lead to distinctive recollections, making them less prone to memory distortion than other types of deep or semantic encoding.
People often use metacognitive assumptions to decide whether an event has been previously experienced. For instance, when trying to remember what they did last week, we assume that most people would be more likely to falsely remember going to the grocery store than going to the circus. Even if neither event occurred, going to the circus is a relatively more distinctive event than going to the grocery store (e.g., its base rate of occurrence is lower, it involves more unusual events, etc.). As such, people would expect more distinctive memories for going to the circus than the grocery store, and these expectations would help them monitor the accuracy of their memories. In general, episodic memories often are reconstructed using available information in memory as well as one's expectations as to what they should remember (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Schacter, Norman, & Koutsaal, 1998) . Such reconstructive processes can lead to false recognition and other types of memory distortion, depending on the accuracy of retrieval monitoring processes.
Distinctiveness Heuristic
Recent laboratory research suggests that memory distortions can be reduced using a retrieval monitoring process called the distinctiveness heuristic (Schacter, Israel, & Racine, 1999 ). This heuristic is used when one correctly rejects an item as having been studied in a target source because that item does not bring to mind detailed recollections that would be expected if it had been studied in that source. The majority of studies investigating the distinctiveness heuristic have used stimuli differing on a perceptual level, such as pictures compared to words, (see Gallo, 2006; Schacter & Wiseman, 2006 , for reviews). Many studies have shown that memory distortion is reduced when participants search memory for pictures relative to words, ostensibly because pictures are expected to elicit more distinctive recollections compared with words (e.g., Dodson & Schacter, 2002; Schacter et al., 1999) . Pictures elicit more elaborate sensory processing than words, which in turn enhances the quality of recollections for pictures (i.e., the number of unique perceptual features retrieved for each item, see Nelson, Reed, & McEvoy, 1977) . These qualities help differentiate pictures from words in memory and also help differentiate each picture from each other picture, factors that are known to enhance recollective distinctiveness (Hunt & McDaniel, 1993) . According to the distinctiveness heuristic theory, participants develop metacognitive expectations about these recollection differences and subsequently use this knowledge to enhance the accuracy of decision processes at retrieval.
In relating the distinctiveness heuristic to dual process theories of memory, Gallo, Weiss, and Schacter (2004) noted that the distinctiveness heuristic is based on qualitative differences in recollection, as opposed to quantitative differences in familiarity.
Here recollection refers to the retrieval of information that is not contained in retrieval cues, whereas familiarity refers to a decontextualized feeling that a retrieval cue was previously processed, without bringing to mind specific recollections. After forming expectations for recollecting unique perceptual features from pic-tures, participants can set recollection-based criteria for corresponding test items. If these retrieval cues (e.g., nonstudied words on a recognition test) do not result in recollections that meet these recollection-based criteria (e.g., unique perceptual features), then participants assume or infer that the cue was not associated with a picture at study. Gallo and colleagues (Gallo, 2004; Gallo, Bell, Beier, & Schacter, 2006) called this a diagnostic decision process (i.e., when the failure to recollect expected information leads to a correct rejection), differentiating it from other types of recollection-based decision processes, such as recall-to-reject (i.e., when information is recollected that disqualifies an event from having occurred in the target source). Diagnostic monitoring processes, such as the distinctiveness heuristic, are central to the source monitoring framework (Johnson et al., 1993) , are similar to the idea of "memorability heuristics" (e.g., Hicks & Marsh, 1999) , and also could be conceptualized within multidimensional signal detection theories. However, from the present conceptualization, the distinctiveness heuristic theory does not assume a particular framework or model of memory. Rather, it is a theory about the recollection-based decision processes that participants can use at the time of retrieval. If such diagnostic monitoring is not applied or is applied less effectively, as when participants base their decisions on vague feelings of familiarity or less distinctive recollections, then false recognition is more likely to result. Gallo et al. (2004) designed a special type of source memory task, dubbed the criterial recollection task, as a way of disentangling a recollection-based distinctiveness heuristic from familiarity effects on false recognition. This task provides a more direct measure of the effects of different retrieval orientations on memory accuracy compared to earlier tasks. 1 In this task, participants studied a list of unrelated words in black font, each corresponding to a common object. Some black words were paired with the same word in red font and others were paired with a colored picture of the object. Test words were presented in black font, and participants were given different retrieval instructions across test blocks. On the red word test, they decided whether the test word had been studied in red font, whereas on the picture test they decided whether the test word had been paired with a picture at study. Because some items had been studied in red font and with pictures, participants could not use a mutual-exclusion rule (or recall-toreject) to avoid false recognition (for converging evidence, see Gallo, Cotel, Moore, & Schacter, 2007) . Instead, they had to selectively search their memory for the criterial recollection (red font on the red word test and pictures on the picture test). The critical finding from this study was that false alarms were reduced on the picture test compared to the red word test, independent of whether the red words were made more familiar than pictures (via study repetition). These effects were attributed to more accurate recollection-based monitoring on the picture test (i.e., the distinctiveness heuristic), owing to greater recollective distinctiveness of pictures relative to red words.
Cognitive Operations
The majority of prior experiments on the distinctiveness heuristic (e.g., Budson et al., 2005; Dodson & Schacter, 2002; Gallo et al., 2006; Schacter et al., 1999) have manipulated the perceptual distinctiveness of the stimuli or encoding processes (e.g., pictures versus words or speaking words aloud versus reading them).
However, according to the source monitoring framework, retrieval decisions can be influenced by memory for internally generated information in addition to information that is externally perceived or generated. During the encoding of events, the source monitoring framework assumes that we store memories for the cognitive operations involved at study, including records of organizing, elaborating, retrieving, or identifying information. It follows from these ideas that a recollection-based distinctiveness heuristic might be elicited by internally generated cognitive operations, those that occur without overtly perceiving or generating information that is perceptually distinctive.
A few studies have provided evidence that encoding tasks differing in cognitive operations can reduce false recognition or source misattributions. For example, self-generated study items are thought to influence the accuracy of subsequent source memory judgments via the it-had-to-be-you effect (Johnson, Raye, Foley, & Foley, 1981) . According to this idea, participants expect to recollect more cognitive operations for internally generated than for externally presented items; and, as a result, they are more likely to avoid misattributions for generated items at test. Similarly, generation tasks have been found to enhance accuracy relative to passive presentation in false recognition tasks (e.g., Gunter, Bodner, & Azad, 2007; Hicks & Marsh, 1999; McCabe & Smith, 2006) . These findings are consistent with the idea that generation tasks can be more distinctive in memory than simply reading or hearing an item, potentially owing to the amount of cognitive operations involved. However, factors other than distinctive cognitive operations also may have contributed to these reductions of false alarms. In addition to potential confounds inherent to the DeeseRoediger-McDermott (DRM) task used in most of these studies (see Footnote 1 and Gunter et al., 2007) , some of the generation tasks may have enhanced semantic processing relative to the control tasks (see McElroy & Slamecka, 1982) . The potential for elevated semantic processing weakens an interpretation based on cognitive operations, because such deep levels of processing are themselves sufficient to elicit a distinctiveness heuristic, relative to passive presentation or more shallow tasks (e.g., Gallo, Meadow, Johnson, & Foster, 2008 ; also see Smith & Hunt, 1998) . Further, many generation tasks involve the presentation of stimuli in unusual formats that need to be solved (e.g., Pig Latin in McCabe & Smith, 2006 ; anagrams with transposed letters in Hicks & Marsh, 1999) , and these formats themselves are likely to be perceptually distinctive. This is not to say that generation tasks do not involve cognitive operations (for a recent analysis see Foley & Foley, 2007) , but rather that factors other than cognitive operations also may have contributed to false recognition effects in these studies.
Another limitation of these prior studies is that they failed to adequately control for potential familiarity differences across the 1 The distinctiveness heuristic was initially proposed to explain findings in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) false memory task (e.g., Schacter et al., 1999) . However, several factors are known to influence false recognition rates in that task (e.g., the degree of associative activation or gist at study, study-based monitoring of nonpresented items, and testbased monitoring processes, such as the distinctiveness heuristic). Subsequent work suggests that the distinctiveness heuristic does influence this task independent from these other processes (for review see Gallo, 2006) , but these other processes nevertheless represent potential confounds in most DRM studies. different encoding tasks. Self-generation tasks have been found to increase both recollection and familiarity relative to passive control tasks (for review, see Yonelinas, 2002) . As described by Gallo et al. (2004) , increased levels of familiarity from a given source or encoding task can lead participants to set a more conservative familiarity-based response criterion when attempting to recognize items from that particular source. Even in the simplest signal detection model, such a familiarity-based criterion shift could reduce rates of false recognition, independent from the use of recollection-based processes, such as the distinctiveness heuristic. As such, prior demonstrations that generation effects can suppress false recognition may be attributable to recollection-based effects, familiarity-based effects, or some combination of both.
Given these various theoretical ambiguities, the present research had three goals. First, we wanted to assess the ability of internal cognitive operations to elicit a recollection-based distinctiveness heuristic, while controlling for semantic processing differences that can potentially confound other types of generation tasks. To achieve this end, we investigated whether autobiographical elaboration could suppress false recognition, relative to semantic judgment tasks. As described in the next section, autobiographical elaboration is a relatively simple encoding task that nevertheless involves numerous cognitive operations. Further, it is one of the few generation tasks that has been found to enhance subsequent recollection relative to other forms of deep, item-specific processing, providing a stronger control against semantic-processing confounds than other generation tasks. Second, we took stronger measures to disentangle recollection and familiarity effects than in prior research by explicitly manipulating the relative levels of familiarity of the stimuli via study repetition in the criterial recollection task. Third, we developed more fine-grained subjective measures of recollection, in an attempt to independently measure recollective distinctiveness and thereby test the assumptions made by the distinctiveness heuristic theory.
Autobiographical Elaboration
Autobiographical elaboration is the process of retrieving an autobiographical memory in response to a cue word (i.e., the Galton-Crovitz method; Galton, 1879; see also Crovitz & Schiffman, 1974) . Although this task requires a deep or semantic level of processing (i.e., one needs to process the meaning of the cue word in order to retrieve a relevant memory), research has shown that autobiographical elaboration leads to greater recall than typical semantic orienting tasks, such as pleasantness judgments (e.g., Bower & Gilligan, 1979; Klein, Loftus, & Burton, 1989) . It has been suggested that autobiographical elaboration elicits distinctive recollections by promoting item-specific encoding (Klein & Loftus, 1988; Smith & Hunt, 2005) . This item-specific information likely arises from associating each cue word to a unique autobiographical memory, including the effortful search and retrieval of perceptually and conceptually detailed information, as well as the use of self-referential processes that are known to enhance true recall and recognition (e.g., Brown, Keenan, & Potts, 1986; Klein & Kihlstrom, 1986; Klein & Loftus, 1988; Klein et al., 1989; Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977; see Symons & Johnson, 1997, for review) .
Autobiographical elaboration requires several cognitive operations that are not required with other deep levels of processing (e.g., making semantic judgments). Conway (2005) described multiple stages during autobiographical construction and elaboration, including searches of episodic and more general knowledge, mental imagery, and evaluative processes. The search process frequently begins by elaborating on the presented cue to correspond to some aspect of one's current life (e.g., recalling an object from one's home) or by elaborating on a specific time period or general event (e.g., during one's childhood). This elaboration process continues until one is satisfied that a specific memory has been retrieved. Some evidence that autobiographical elaboration can involve multiple cognitive operations comes from response latencies that can span up to 30 seconds, compared to semantic judgments, which generally take only a second or two (Conway, 2005) . Similarly, Addis, Wong, and Schacter (2007) and Hassabis and Maguire (2007) described autobiographical elaboration as a process that requires the ability to form mental images, construct a narrative structure, and retrieve semantic information. Although the exact processes involved may vary across situations, all conceptualizations of autobiographical elaboration involve multiple cognitive operations. These properties make autobiographical elaboration an ideal task to investigate the degree to which cognitive operations can elicit a distinctiveness heuristic, relative to other deep processing tasks that do not require the same degree of cognitive operations.
Although dozens of studies have documented the autobiographical elaboration effect on true memory, no studies have investigated the effects of autobiographical elaboration on false memory. In the current studies, we had participants engage in autobiographical elaboration as well as semantic judgments during the study phase (manipulated within-subjects but across items). We then gave criterial recollection tests similar to those of Gallo et al. (2004) . Instead of manipulating materials (i.e., pictures compared to words), we kept the stimuli materials (words) constant while manipulating encoding processes. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants studied trait words and were asked to either retrieve an autobiographical memory (i.e., autobiographical elaboration) or make a semantic judgment (i.e., valence rating). Participants were then given three tests: a standard recognition test, a semantic test (i.e., valence-rating test), and an autobiographical test. The standard test allowed us to measure the autobiographical elaboration effect on overall memory strength to studied items (i.e., the overall combination of recollection and familiarity to performance; cf. Wixted, 2007) . The criterial recollection tests allowed us to measure the influence of retrieval expectations on false recognition. The distinctiveness heuristic theory predicts that items eliciting distinctive recollections will also influence one's metacognitive beliefs about what one should remember. To the extent that autobiographical elaboration serves as an encoding process that elicits more distinctive recollections than semantic judgments, it should enhance the accuracy of retrieval monitoring processes (e.g., the distinctiveness heuristic). As a result, false alarms should be reduced on the autobiographical test compared to the semantic test.
Semantic judgment tasks are an appropriate comparison task to autobiographical elaboration because both tasks rely solely on the internal generation of relevant information from memory. However, as described above, semantic judgments do not require the same degree of cognitive operations compared to the generation of autobiographical memories, allowing us to test whether cognitive operations can elicit a distinctiveness heuristic. Further, semantic judgments involve item-specific processes that require participants to focus on the meaning of words. Such judgments have been shown to reduce false memories in other studies, relative to passive presentation or more shallow tasks (e.g., Gallo et al., 2008; Smith & Hunt, 1998) . These effects suggest that semantic judgments can themselves elicit a recollection-based distinctiveness heuristic, providing a strong comparison task to autobiographical elaboration. In contrast to prior studies comparing words and pictures, both autobiographical elaboration and semantic judgments are thought to encourage somewhat distinctive recollections (and corresponding decision processes). Nevertheless, because of the relatively greater number of cognitive operations involved, autobiographical elaboration is predicted to elicit relatively more distinctive recollections than semantic judgments and a relatively more effective distinctiveness heuristic.
By investigating the extent that internally generated cognitive operations can enhance the effectiveness of the distinctiveness heuristic, the current study provides an important test of the generality of the theory. Although performing multiple cognitive operations can enhance true memory and source attributions, in order to suppress false recognition via a distinctiveness heuristic, participants need to expect to recollect these cognitive operations at test. In the case of autobiographical elaboration, distinctive autobiographical memories may need to be retrieved for each cue word, and, further, these memories may need to be successfully associated with the respective cue word that had elicited them. Otherwise, at test, participants might not expect to remember distinctive autobiographical elaborations for all of the items that had occurred in the autobiographical elaboration condition, and they might be confused as to which test words had elicited which memories. The ability of the item to cue relevant cognitive operations performed at study is a potentially limiting factor to using any type of cognitive operations to elicit a distinctiveness heuristic. In contrast, semantic judgments are directed towards the specific meaning of each studied item and so may be easier to remember on a subsequent test than autobiographical elaborations. It is an open question as to whether the added cognitive operations involved in autobiographical elaboration would be sufficient to increase retrieval monitoring accuracy relative to semantic judgments.
Experiment 1

Method
Participants. Twenty-four undergraduates (19 women) at the University of Chicago participated in the experiment for course credit or $10.
Materials and design. The stimuli included 96 positive and 96 negative trait words from Anderson's likeability ratings (Anderson, 1968) . At study, participants received two tasks: the autobiographical elaboration task and the valence-rating task. One-fourth of the trait words were studied in the autobiographical elaboration task only, one-fourth were studied in the valence-rating task only, one-fourth were presented in both tasks, and one-fourth were not studied. Items were counterbalanced across the four types of conditions (autobiographical memory, valence, both, and nonstudied). Some items were studied in both tasks (autobiographical and valence) so that the presentation conditions were not mutually exclusive, thereby preventing participants from using a recall-toreject strategy at test (e.g., recalling that an item had occurred in one encoding task to infer that the item could not have been presented in the other). In the criterial recollection task, recalling that an item was presented in one condition (e.g., the valence task) would not necessarily disqualify the item from also having been presented on the other condition (e.g., the autobiographical task). Instead, participants needed to selectively search memory for the to-be-recollected information on each test, thereby allowing us to determine the effects of retrieval orientation (and corresponding differences in recollective expectations) on memory performance.
The test phase consisted of three test blocks (standard test, autobiographical test, and valence test) with order counterbalanced across subjects. The standard test consisted of old-new recognition judgments for the trait words as well as remember-know judgments (Gardiner & Java, 1991; Rajaram, 1993; Yonelinas, 2002) . The other two tests were criterial recollection tests , in which participants had to selectively recollect whether they had retrieved an autobiographical memory of the trait (autobiographical test) or whether they rated the valence of the trait (valence test). Each item during the test phase was presented in the same font as it was presented during the study phase along with the appropriate test prompt (i.e., "Studied?" for the standard test, "Specific Memory?" for the autobiographical test, and "Positive/ Negative?" for the valence test). During each test block, participants were tested on 64 items (randomly arranged). There were 16 items of each type (autobiographical, valence, both, new) in each of the three testing conditions.
Procedure. Trait words were blocked at study by encoding task. In the autobiographical elaboration task, participants were presented with a trait word and asked to recall a specific memory in which they exemplified the presented trait. To encourage successful retrieval, participants were required to take at least 5 s to retrieve the memory (Conway, 2005) . In pilot testing, we found that some participants had difficulty retrieving autobiographical memories for negative traits. To avoid this problem, participants were instructed that in the event that they could not think of a memory for the presented trait, they should think of a memory in which they exemplified the opposite behavior of the presented trait. After retrieving an autobiographical memory, participants rated how strongly they believed the trait described them in the retrieved memory on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree). In the valence task, participants were presented with a trait word and asked to rate whether the trait was positive or negative on a scale from 1 (very negative) to 4 (very positive). In both tasks, the next trait followed 400 ms after the participant's judgment from the previous trait.
Each of the three tests was self-paced. On the autobiographical test, participants were to press the yes button if they remembered retrieving an autobiographical memory (i.e., autobiographical memory only or both items), otherwise to press the no button. On the valence test, they were to press yes if they remembered rating the word as being positive or negative (i.e., valence only or both items), otherwise to press no. On the standard test, participants were instructed to press yes for any test word that corresponded to a studied stimulus, regardless of the study format (i.e., for any trait word that an autobiographical memory was retrieved or a valence rating was made) and no for new items. Following each yes-no judgment on the standard test, participants were then asked to rate whether the item was "actually recollected" (AR) or "very famil-iar" (VF; e.g., Gardiner & Java, 1991; Rajaram, 1993; Yonelinas, 2002) . Recollection judgments were made if they could "recall (or bring to mind) a specific memory of the test word's presentation (i.e., you actually remember seeing the trait presented and relating it to yourself or giving a positive-negative judgment on the computer screen)." Familiar judgments were made if the "test word is familiar and you think that it had been presented, but you cannot actually recollect any details of the trait as being presented. You just know it was studied." Finally, it was stressed that the difference between Actually Recollect and Very Familiar is not confidence: "You might be very confident that an item was studied (because it is very familiar), but you can't recollect seeing the trait presented for yourself or making a positive-negative judgment for it. Alternatively, you might be very confident that the item was studied because you recollect very vivid details of the experience."
Results and Discussion
Study judgments. As expected, for valence judgments, participants rated 94% of the positive trait words as positive, and 95% of the negative trait words as negative. For autobiographical judgments, participants indicated that they exemplified the trait for 78% of the positive trait words, and for 37% of the negative trait words, t(23) ϭ 7.34, SEM ϭ .056, d ϭ 1.96, p Ͻ .001. This difference indicates that participants found it easier to retrieve positive memories of themselves than negative memories (cf. Bower & Gilligan, 1979; Conway, 2005) . A preliminary analysis of our data indicated that trait valence did not interact with our false recognition effects of interest, and so we collapse across this variable for simplicity.
Recognition judgments. The results from the recognition judgments are summarized in the left columns of Table 1 . As in prior work in this task , we analyzed each test separately, then compared across the criterial recollection tests. On the standard test, autobiographical hits (M ϭ .91) were greater than valence hits, (.84), t(23) ϭ 2.66, SEM ϭ .026, d ϭ .51, p Ͻ .02, indicating that autobiographical elaboration led to better memory than the semantic task. Further, all hit rates were greater than false alarms to new items (.25), demonstrating significant discrimination in all cases. Not surprisingly, hits to items studied in both the autobiographical elaboration and the semantic conditions (.98) were greater than hits to items studied in only one of these conditions, owing to the fact that these items had been studied twice. In general, hits to "both" items tended to be greater than hits to items studied once in all of our experiments. As discussed above, these "both" items were presented only as fillers, to minimize the possibility of participants using an exclusion strategy; and so, for simplicity, we will not discuss them further.
On the valence test, valence hits (.72) were greater than false alarms to studied lures, (.55), t (23) Gallo et al., 2004) and are consistent with the idea that participants were more effective at using the distinctiveness heuristic on the autobiographical test than on the valence test. Subjective judgments. The results from the subjective judgments are summarized in the right columns of Table 1 . Autobiographical items were rated as AR (.66) more than valence items, (.50), t(23) ϭ 3.88, SEM ϭ .043, d ϭ .85, p ϭ .001. This finding is consistent with the idea that autobiographical retrieval leads to more distinctive recollections than valence judgments, although, as discussed by Gallo et al. (2004) , differences in AR judgments might reflect qualitative as well as quantitative differences in recollection (we discuss this point more in the context of Experiments 2 and 3). In contrast to the AR judgments, participants made more "very familiar" (VF) judgments for valence items (.32) than for autobiographical items, (.22), t(23) ϭ Ϫ3.29, SEM ϭ .030, d ϭ .57, p Ͻ .005. We do not interpret this finding as indicating that valence items were more familiar than autobiographical items, though, because there are measurement issues surrounding VF judgments. According to dual-process models, these judgments underestimate familiarity because VF judgments can only be made when recollection is absent, and so a correction is necessary. We therefore used the independent remember-know procedure (IRK; see Yonelinas, 2002 ) on VF judgments, in which the raw proportion of VF judgments is expressed as a proportion of only those trials where such a judgment could have been made (e.g., 1 -AR). Using this adjustment, we found no differences in familiarity between autobiographical items (.70) and valence items (.69), d ϭ .03, p Ͼ .05. These data suggest that valence items were equated in familiarity to the autobiographical items, suggesting that false recognition difference across the criterial recollection tests was not likely due to familiarity processes but instead was due to differences in recollective expectations.
Experiment 2
The results from Experiment 1 are consistent with the use of a recollection-based distinctiveness heuristic, but it is necessary to consider in more depth whether familiarity-based processes might be able to explain the results. Although familiarity estimates (using IRK) did not differ across the item types, one might question these subjective estimates, focusing instead on the finding that autobiographical items were recognized more often than valence items on the standard test. According to some models (Joordens & Merikle, 1993) , this effect would be taken to indicate that familiarity was greater for autobiographical items than valence items. If so, then participants might have adopted a more stringent familiarity-based response criterion on the autobiographical test than on the valence test, thereby reducing false alarms on the autobiographical test independent of a recollection-based distinctiveness heuristic. Furthermore, if autobiographical items were more familiar than valence items, then this familiarity difference alone may have caused the observed differences in false alarms to studied lures across the criterial tests (autobiographical lures on the valence test Ͼ valence lures on the autobiographical test), even in the absence of any differences in familiarity-based criteria or recollection-based expectations. Although the criterial recollection tests were designed to elicit recollection-based responding, they also are influenced by familiarity and so these other alternatives need to be ruled out.
The goal for Experiment 2 was to summarily test all of these competing hypotheses by repeating valence items four times during study. Repetition should increase the overall memory strength of valence items (e.g., the combined influence of recollection and familiarity), potentially reversing the autobiographical elaboration effect on hit rates on the standard test, as well as relative levels of familiarity. Reversing the familiarity of the items provides a strong test of familiarity-based explanations of the false recognition effects observed in Experiment 1. If those effects were due to familiarity-based criterion shifts, then making valence items more familiar than autobiographical items should elicit a more conservative criterion on the valence test, reducing false alarms relative to the autobiographical test. One also might assume that study repetition would increase the frequency that participants would recollect valence items, thereby allowing participants to better use recollection-based monitoring processes on the valence test. However, we assumed that repetition would not change the qualitative nature of the cognitive operations engendered by these different encoding tasks and that autobiographical elaboration would still elicit more distinctive recollections than valence judgments. Thus, the distinctiveness heuristic theory predicts the same pattern of false recognition results as in Experiment 1, even though relative levels of familiarity would be different in this experiment. Because autobiographical elaboration is hypothesized to elicit more distinctive recollections than valence judgments, false alarms should be reduced on the autobiographical test compared to the valence test.
Method
Participants. Twenty-four undergraduates (17 women) at the University of Chicago participated in the experiment for course credit or $10.
Materials, design, and procedure. The stimuli for Experiment 2 were identical to Experiment 1 except the items in the valencerating task were presented four times to make valence items more familiar than autobiographical items. The procedure was also the same, except participants were told that the items in the valencerating task would be repeated four times.
Results and Discussion
Study judgments. Results from the study phase were similar to that of Experiment 1. For valence judgments, participants rated 97% of the positive trait words as positive, and 95% of the negative trait words as negative. For autobiographical judgments, participants indicated that they exemplified the trait in the memory for 79% of the positive trait words and for 38% of the negative trait words, t(23) ϭ Ϫ6.80, SEM ϭ .061, d ϭ 2.45, p Ͻ .001. A preliminary analysis of trait valence indicated that this variable did not interact with our false recognition effects of interest, and so we collapse across this variable for simplicity.
Recognition judgments. The overall mean recognition scores can be found in Dodson & Schacter, 2001) , and the absence of an effect in the present study may have been due to floor effects.
Subjective judgments. Overall subjective memory results can be found in Table 2 . The familiarity judgments are the most critical for a familiarity-based criterion shift account. Based on the IRK procedure, familiarity estimates were greater for valence items (.88) than for autobiographical items, (.68), t(23) ϭ Ϫ3.62, SEM ϭ .055, d ϭ .95, p ϭ .001. These results are consistent with the prediction that repeating the valence items would make them more familiar than autobiographical items, and stand in contrast to the reverse effect obtained on false alarms (valence items less than autobiographical items). Despite this familiarity difference, false recognition was still lower on the autobiographical test compared to the valence test. Therefore, differences in familiarity between the two item types cannot explain the reduction in false alarms we obtained in both of our experiments.
In contrast to Experiment 1, there was no significant difference in AR judgments between valence items (.78) and autobiographical items, (.68), t(23) ϭ Ϫ1.85, SEM ϭ .052, d ϭ .43, p ϭ .08; and, if anything, the effect was in the opposite direction. We expected that autobiographical items would elicit more distinctive recollections than valence items; but, as discussed by Gallo et al. (2004) , subjective remember judgments might reflect quantitative differences in recollection (e.g., recollection strength) that do not necessarily map onto qualitative differences in the number of unique features retrieved (e.g., recollective distinctiveness). Semantic recollections may have been qualitatively less rich or distinctive than autobiographical recollections, but repetition of semantic judgments may have increased the overall frequency (or quantity) of those recollections, thereby increasing the total number of Actually Recollect judgments. Because the typical instructions for remember-know judgments do not distinguish potentially important differences between recollection quantity and quality(e.g., Rajaram, 1993; Tulving, 1985) , interpretation of these Actually Recollect judgments is somewhat ambiguous. Because of this ambiguity, Experiment 3 was designed to provide a more fine-grained analysis of the potential subjective differences elicited by our encoding tasks.
Experiment 3
Experiments 1 and 2 indicated that, as predicted, participants were less likely to make false recognition errors when searching memory for prior autobiographical elaborations compared to prior semantic judgments. Further, these effects were obtained even though estimates of familiarity (using IRK) were equal across the Note. The standard test consisted of old-new recognition judgments; the other two tests were criterial recollection tests of whether a trait had been studied in that condition or not. FA ϭ false alarms; IRK ϭ independent remember-know.
two encoding tasks (Experiment 1) or greater for the semantic task (Experiment 2). These results argue against a familiarity-based explanation of our false recognition effects, and are more consistent with the use of a recollection-based distinctiveness heuristic. However, as discussed above, the Actually Recollect judgments were somewhat ambiguous across experiments, being greater for autobiographical items in Experiment 1 (as predicted) but showing no difference across the items in Experiment 2 (contrary to prediction). Given this null effect in Experiment 2, we set out to obtain an independent measure of our assumption that autobiographical elaboration leads to qualitatively more distinctive recollections than semantic judgments. Experiment 3 was designed to provide converging evidence for our assumptions about recollection and familiarity in Experiments 1 and 2. Following Gallo et al. (2008) , participants participated in the same encoding tasks as in Experiments 1 and 2; but, instead of the criterial recollection tests, they were given tests designed to provide more insight in the subjective differences of theoretical interest. The first test was a speeded old-new recognition test, designed to minimize the use of recollection and therefore provide a more objective estimate of relative differences in familiarity than in prior experiments. The second test was a replication of the self-paced standard recognition test from Experiments 1 and 2, again obtaining Actually Recollect and Very Familiar judgments. The third test also was self-paced and was designed to more specifically probe potential differences in recollection strength (i.e., quantitative differences in recollection) and recollection detail (i.e., qualitative differences in recollection), using a continuous rating scale (cf., Higham & Vokey, 2004) .
Method
Participants. Twenty-four undergraduates (18 women) at the University of Chicago participated for course credit.
Materials and design. The same materials (trait words) were used as in Experiments 1 and 2, and participants again received two tasks: the autobiographical elaboration task and the valencerating task. One-fourth of the trait words were studied once in the autobiographical elaboration task only, one-fourth were studied once in the valence-rating task (as in Experiment 1), one-fourth were studied four times in the valence-rating task (as in Experiment 2), and one-fourth were not studied. Items were counterbalanced across these four conditions. For simplicity, items studied in both conditions (autobiographical and valence) were not included in Experiment 3. These items were included in prior experiments to prevent a recall-to-reject strategy, but because this strategy would not apply to any of the tests in this experiment, we instead included more observations in the conditions of primary interest. During each test block, participants were tested on 64 items (randomly arranged). There were 16 items of each type (autobiographical, valence 1ϫ, valence 4ϫ, nonstudied) in each of the three testing conditions.
The test phase consisted of three test blocks (speeded test, actually recollect/very familiar test, and recollection quality test). The speeded test consisted of old-new recognition judgments in which participants were required to respond between 600 and 750 ms using a tempo procedure (Balota, Burgess, Cortese & Adams, 2002) . The actually recollect/very familiar test was analogous to the standard test of Experiments 1 and 2. The recollection quality test was designed to provide a more detailed measure of the subjective experience of recollection. This test was administered after the actually recollect/very familiar test so that the participants would already understand the distinction between recollection and familiarity. This test consisted of two judgments: recollection strength and, unique recollected details, as described in the Procedure section.
Procedure. The procedures for the study phase were identical to those in Experiments 1 and 2. In the first test block, participants were told that they would be presented with studied and nonstudied items and were to make speeded yes-no recognition decisions. Participants initiated each trial via the spacebar, and then were prompted with a series of two visual arrows that appeared 700 ms apart. On the third beat, the test item appeared on the computer screen, and the participants were to make their recognition response on the fourth beat. If their response was between 600 and 750 ms, then a "good" signal appeared and they were allowed to press the spacebar to initiate the next item. Otherwise, a "too fast" or "too slow" prompt appeared on the screen for 3 s, accompanied by an error sound over the headphones. Participants were instructed to be as accurate as possible and respond on time.
The second test block was self-paced. Participants again were told that they would see studied and nonstudied items. For each item they made one of three judgments: actually recollect, very familiar, or new. The instructions for this test were the same as in Experiments 1 and 2.
The third test block also was self-paced. It was designed to provide a more detailed measure of the subjective experience of recollection. For each item on the final test, participants made two consecutive ratings on a 0 to 7 scale. The first question was "How STRONG is your actual recollection for this item?" The second question was "How DETAILED is your actual recollection of this item?" Importantly, we designed the second judgment to be more relevant to the qualitative recollection differences assumed by the distinctiveness heuristic theory. However, we also realized that subjective judgments can sometimes be difficult for participants to understand. Given our concern that these judgments could be influenced by both quantitative and qualitative differences in recollection, we therefore had participants first make a judgment about recollection "strength" (e.g., a quantitative judgment). By breaking these into two judgments, we sought to make explicit the distinction between these two aspects of recollection, potentially minimizing the possibility that judgments of recollected details would be contaminated by quantitative differences in memory strength. Also, note that the instructions for the recollected detail rating included examples from both the semantic judgment and the autobiographical task, so as not to bias these judgments in either direction. Exact instructions for these ratings were as follows:
This time, we are not interested in vague or general feelings of familiarity at all. Instead, your job is to make more specific ratings for your actual recollections from the study phase, using two different judgments for each test item. The first judgment is on recollection strength, and the second is on recollection details.
On the first judgment we would like you to rate how strong, or vivid, your actual recollection is for the item presented. For example, you may have a very strong or vivid memory of the negative-positive prompt appearing. Similarly, you may have a very strong or vivid memory you associated with the item. Alternatively, you may have a weak or vague recollection of the item being associated with a valence judgment or a specific memory, or might simply think the item is familiar but may not recollect much about the experience. In these cases, you should give a low rating of actual recollection strength. Please rate your recollection strength on a 0 -7 scale where a rating of 0 would indicate that you do not recollect the item at all, a rating of 1 would indicate your recollection for the item is weak, or vague, and a rating of 7 would indicate your recollection is strong, or vivid.
On the second judgment, which is on recollection detail or distinctiveness, we would like you to rate the number of unique details that you can recollect that are different from other items in the study phase, independent of how strong or vivid those recollections may be. Please rate the number of unique details on a 0 -7 scale where a rating of 0 would indicate that you do not recollect many unique details for the item. For example, when presented with an item, you may recollect some details that are unique to the item presented. You may remember several different reasons or associations that you made to determine that this item was negative or positive, or you may remember many details of the specific memory; this would be given a rating of 4 -5 because the details are unique or distinctive to the item. Alternatively, you may not recollect many details, or you may recollect several details that are not unique to the item presented. Or, to give another example, you may have a general recollection of the memory or the valence judgment, but because you have these same sorts of general memories for many of the other items, these recollections would be given a rating of 1 -2 because the details are not unique to the specific item presented. Remember that these judgments are about your memories for distinctive details that you encoded during the study phase, not whether you can think of new, unique details during the test. In order to make sure that you understand this task, please repeat back to me what you will do during this test."
Results and Discussion
Study judgments. Results from the study phase were similar to those of Experiments 1 and 2. For valence judgments, participants rated 96% of the positive trait words as positive and 97% of the negative trait words as negative. For autobiographical judgments, participants indicated that they exemplified the trait in the memory for 75% of the positive trait words and for 47% of the negative trait words, t (23) . These results bolster the conclusion that the false recognition differences observed across the criterial recollection tests in Experiments 1 and 2 were not due to greater levels of familiarity of autobiographical items. By either measure, valence items were equally familiar with autobiographical items (Experiment 1) or more familiar (Experiment 2), and yet false recognition was reduced on the autobiographical test in each experiment.
Recollection quality results. As discussed, the recollectionstrength judgments were created to measure potential differences in recollection quantity, as a means of avoiding the possibility that these differences could contaminate ratings of recollection detail. Results indicate that autobiographical items (4.98) were rated significantly higher in recollection strength compared to valence 1ϫ items, (4.54), t (23) Note. Ratings for the recollection quality judgments were on a 0 -7 scale. Yes ϭ recognized item; IRK (independent remember-know) ϭ familiarity estimate from independent-recollection-familiarity adjustment; AE ϭ words were studied once in the autobiographical elaboration task only; Val1 ϭ words were studied once in the valence rating task; Val4 ϭ words were studied four times in the valence rating task; New ϭ words were not studied. a Strength scale: 0 (no recollection) to 7 (recollection strong or vivid). b Details scale: 0 (do not recollect many unique details) to 7 (recollect many unique details). when these items were equated for the number of study presentations, but repeating valence items four times at study reversed this strength difference. These patterns were analogous to those observed in AR judgments.
Most importantly, the ratings of recollected details were intended to capture the qualitative uniqueness of each recollection, independent from potential differences in recollection quantity. As predicted, autobiographical items (3.48) were rated significantly higher than valence 1ϫ items, (2.67), t(23) ϭ 3.48, SEM ϭ 0.23, d ϭ .59, p Ͻ .01. This finding is similar to that found with the other types of recollection ratings, and it provides even stronger evidence that autobiographical elaboration elicited more distinctive recollections than valence judgments, at least when the two were equated for presentation frequency during study. However, ratings for autobiographical items and valence 4ϫ items (3.71) did not significantly differ from each other (d ϭ .15, p Ͼ .05). This outcome is at odds with our assumption that autobiographical items would be rated as having more unique recollected details than valence judgments, irrespective of the number of study repetitions. Although care should be taken when interpreting a null result, it may have been that some of the items in the repeated valence condition cued autobiographical elaborations that were made to other items, and these source confusions enhanced ratings of recollection quality for these valence items. Because many of the trait words were semantically similar (e.g., intelligent and smart), such misrecollections may have occurred frequently. We addressed this issue by changing our materials in Experiments 4 -6.
In sum, both of the familiarity estimates from Experiment 3 were consistent with our findings from Experiments 1 and 2. However, the judgments of recollection detail were only partly consistent with our assumptions. These judgments were significantly greater for autobiographical items than for valence items when equated on presentation frequency. This difference was predicted and provides converging evidence that the cognitive operations involved in autobiographical elaboration led to more distinctive recollections than valence judgments. In contrast, there was no difference when valence items were repeated at study. Experiments 4 -6 provided additional tests of the distinctiveness heuristic theory and its underlying assumptions.
Experiment 4
The results of Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that participants used a distinctiveness heuristic when attempting to retrieve trait words associated with autobiographical elaboration, analogous to studies that used picture presentation to elicit a distinctiveness heuristic. However, these experiments showed an elevated level of false alarms during the autobiographical test to studied lures (approximately 40%) compared to studies that have used pictures as the distinctive materials (e.g., in Gallo et al., 2004 , false alarms to studied lures on the picture tests were approximately 12%). Because the methods were mostly similar across these studies, we suspected that this difference was due to the use of abstract trait words to elicit autobiographical memories, as opposed to concrete object words that had been used in prior studies. Many of the trait words were semantically related (e.g., synonyms, antonyms, and different aspects of personality traits), potentially leading to a higher degree of semantically based source confusions than unrelated object words. These factors did not interfere with our ability to observe distinctiveness effects on false recognition in Experiments 1 and 2; but, as discussed, they might have influenced the subjective ratings of Experiment 3.
The goals of Experiments 4 -6 were to replicate the pattern of results obtained in prior experiments and to generalize these findings to materials that were potentially less confusable. We therefore presented participants with object words instead of trait words, using the same object words that Gallo et al. (2004) had used to elicit a picture-based distinctiveness heuristic. Because of these different materials, we changed the semantic task to judgments of whether the item was factory made instead of valence judgments (i.e., "Is this item typically made in a factory?"). Similarly, we had participants directly assess the vividness of each autobiographical memory instead of the self-referential rating used for trait words. In addition to potentially reducing source confusions across items, these experiments tested the generalizability of our results to different semantic judgments and to cue words that should have elicited more object-oriented autobiographical elaborations. Other than these changes, the methods of Experiments 4 -6 closely followed those of Experiments 1-3.
Method
Participants. Twenty-four undergraduates (16 women) at the University of Chicago participated in the experiment for course credit or $10.
Materials and design. The stimuli included 192 common object words that were used in prior criterial recollection studies (e.g., Gallo et al., 2004) . Average word length was 6.1 letters, and the average printed word frequency (Kucera & Francis, 1967) was 21.49 per million. Frequency information was not available for 14% of the words.
Procedure. The procedure was similar to Experiment 1 with a few modifications to accommodate the change in materials. In the autobiographical elaboration task, after retrieving an autobiographical memory, participants were asked to rate the vividness of each memory on a scale from 1 (very vague) to 4 (very vivid). In the semantic task, participants were asked to make a factory judgment (yes-no). This task was designed to be semantic but more appropriate to these stimuli than a valence-rating task. We again gave three tests, including a standard recognition test and two criterial recollection tests. On the autobiographical test, participants were instructed to endorse items that had been studied in the autobiographical condition (i.e., autobiographical only or both items), whereas on the factory test they were to press yes whenever they remembered judging the item as being made in a factory (i.e., factory only or both items).
Results and Discussion
Study judgments. For factory judgments, participants rated 63% of the object words as being made in a factory. For autobiographical judgments, participants indicated that 61% of their memories were vivid memories (i.e., rated 3 or 4 on the vividness scale), with only 16% of the items eliciting a rating of 1 (not vivid). Thus, the autobiographical elaboration task elicited memories that had at least some degree of subjectively vivid content. This finding is consistent with the idea that, on average, participants were able to retrieve relatively vivid memories in our autobiographical elaboration task.
Recognition judgments. The test phase results can be found in Table 4 . On the standard test, autobiographical hits (.96) were greater than factory hits, (.83), t(23) ϭ 3.96, SEM ϭ .034, d ϭ .96, p ϭ .001. This finding extends the autobiographical elaboration effect to object words when using a standard recognition test, an effect that has not been consistently found in the literature (Symons & Johnson, 1997) . Our other results also were similar to Experiment 1. On the factory test, factory hits (.80) were greater than false alarms to studied lures, (.40), t (23) Critically, there were significantly fewer false alarms to studied lures on the autobiographical test (.19) than on the factory test, (.40), t(23) ϭ 3.37, SEM ϭ .062, d ϭ .86, p Ͻ .005. This finding replicates the distinctiveness heuristic pattern on studied lures that was observed in Experiments 1 and 2. False recognition of new lures did not differ between the autobiographical test and the factory test ( p Ͼ .05). Finally, note that false alarms to studied lures were lower in the current experiment (.40 on the factory test and .19 on the autobiographical test) compared to analogous conditions in Experiment 1 (.55 and .43, respectively), both ps Ͻ .05. This pattern suggests that switching to concrete object words was effective at minimizing the confusability of stimuli across encoding tasks.
Additional analyses were conducted to determine whether vividness of the autobiographical memories influenced our recognition results. Within each subject, we calculated the proportions of correct responses to autobiographical items on the autobiographical test given that participants rated the item as vivid (i.e., rated as 3 or 4) or not vivid (i.e., rated as 1 or 2). Autobiographical items rated as vivid (.91) were remembered more than items rated as not vivid, (.70), t(23) ϭ 3.63, SEM ϭ .058, d ϭ .85, p ϭ .001. This finding suggests that more vivid memories retrieved at study led to greater hit rates to these same items at test. A similar analysis of false recognition rates was not possible, because autobiographical items at study were presented as the lures on the valence test and not on the autobiographical test. However, a median split analysis revealed no differences in false recognition rates on the autobiographical test between those participants with the highest vividness ratings at study and those with the lowest ratings.
Subjective judgments. Overall subjective memory results can be found in Table 4 . Autobiographical items (.82) were rated as AR more than factory items, (.52), t(23) ϭ 5.61, SEM ϭ .053, d ϭ 1.33, p ϭ .001, analogous to the pattern observed in Experiment 1. For IRK-based familiarity estimates, autobiographical items (.84) were significantly more familiar than factory items, (.74), t(23) ϭ 2.07, SEM ϭ .050, d ϭ .41, p Ͻ .05. This effect was not found in Experiment 1, and it raises the possibility that differences in familiarity could account for the false recognition differences we found across the two criterial recollection tests. Participants may have used more conservative familiarity-based response criteria on the autobiographical test; and, even with the same response criteria, elevated familiarity of autobiographical lures (on the factory test) would have increased false recognition relative to the factory lures (on the autobiographical test). Experiment 5 was designed to test between these familiarity explanations and one based on recollective distinctiveness.
Experiment 5
The results of Experiment 4 closely followed the pattern that was observed in Experiment 1; and, like that experiment, they suggest that participants had used a recollection-based distinctive- Note. The standard test consisted of old-new recognition judgments; the other two tests were criterial recollection tests of whether a trait had been studied in that condition or not. FA ϭ false alarms; IRK ϭ independent remember-know.
ness heuristic to suppress false alarms on the autobiographical test relative to the semantic judgment test. However, familiarity for autobiographical items was greater than items studied in the semantic condition on the standard test. Experiment 5 was therefore designed in a fashion analogous to Experiment 2, repeating the items studied in the semantic judgment condition in an attempt to eliminate or reverse this familiarity effect. Given that autobiographical hits were close to ceiling using object words in Experiment 4, we did not expect to reverse that aspect of performance.
Nevertheless, repeating factory judgments should increase overall familiarity of the factory items, again providing a stronger test of the distinctiveness heuristic theory.
Method
Materials, design, and procedure. The procedure was the same as Experiment 4 except the items in the factory judgment task were presented four times during study and participants were told that these items would be repeated.
Results and Discussion
Study judgments. Similar to Experiment 4, participants rated 67% of the object words as being made in a factory. For autobiographical judgments, participants indicated that 59% of their memories were vivid memories (i.e., rated 3 or 4 on the vividness scale), with only 23% of the items eliciting a rating of 1 (not vivid).
Recognition judgments. The overall mean recognition scores can be found in Critically, there were significantly fewer false alarms to studied lures on the autobiographical test (.13) than false alarms to studied lures on the factory test, (.33), t(23) ϭ 3.67, SEM ϭ .054, d ϭ .84, p ϭ .001. This finding is the third replication of the effect originally reported in Experiment 1 and again suggests that participants had used a recollection-based distinctiveness heuristic on the autobiographical test. Similar to Experiment 4, there were no significant differences in false alarms to new lures across the criterial recollection tests ( p Ͼ .05). Finally, false recognition to studied lures in this experiment (.33 on the factory test and .13 on the autobiographical test) were lower than comparable conditions in Experiment 2 (.47 and .36, respectively), p ϭ .081 and p Ͻ .01, respectively, again suggesting that switching to concrete object words reduced source confusions.
Additional analyses were conducted to determine whether vividness of the autobiographical memories retrieved influenced our recognition effects (one participant who failed to rate any of the autobiographical items on the autobiographical test as vivid was not included for that reason). As in Experiment 4, only effects of vividness on hit rates were found. Autobiographical items rated as vivid (.86) were remembered more than items rated as not vivid, .71, t(22) ϭ 2.80, SEM ϭ .051, d ϭ .55, p ϭ .01.
Subjective judgments. Overall subjective memory results can be found in Table 5 . There were no differences in AR ratings between autobiographical (.74) and factory items (.76), d ϭ .02, p Ͼ .05. IRK-based estimates of familiarity also did not differ, Materials, design and procedure. The same materials (object words) were used as in Experiments 4 and 5. Similarly, participants received two encoding tasks: the autobiographical elaboration task and the factory judgment task. One-fourth of the object words were studied once in the autobiographical elaboration task only (autobiographical 1ϫ), one-fourth were studied once in the factory judgment task (factory 1ϫ), one-fourth were studied four times in the factory judgment task (factory 4ϫ), and one-fourth were not studied. Items were counterbalanced across the four types of conditions (autobiographical 1ϫ, factory 1ϫ, factory 4ϫ, and nonstudied). Similar to Experiment 3, items studied in both conditions (autobiographical and factory) were not included in the current experiment for simplicity. The test phase was analogous to that used in Experiment 3. Participants were then given a speeded recognition test, a self-paced recognition test with actually recollect/very familiar judgments, and the recollection quality test.
Study judgments. Results from the study phase were similar to those of Experiments 4 and 5. For factory judgments, participants rated 65% of the object words as being made in a factory. For autobiographical judgments, participants indicated that 61% of their memories were vivid memories (i.e., rated 3 or 4 on the vividness scale), with only 19% of the items eliciting a rating of 1 (not vivid).
Actually recollect/very familiar results. The mean recognition scores from each test can be found in Table 6 . Autobiographical items were rated as AR ( .80) 
General Discussion
It has long been held that distinctiveness enhances recollection of studied events. However, only recently have researchers begun to intensively study how recollective distinctiveness can reduce false recognition errors via recollection-based decision processes, Note. Ratings for the recollection quality judgments were on a 0 -7 scale. Yes ϭ recognized item; IRK (independent remember-know) ϭ familiarity estimate from independent-recollection-familiarity adjustment; AE ϭ words were studied once in the autobiographical elaboration task only; Fact1 ϭ words were studied once in the factory judgment task; Val4 ϭ words were studied four times in the factory judgment task; New ϭ words were not studied. a Strength scale: 0 (no recollection) to 7 (recollection strong or vivid). b Details scale: 0 (do not recollect many unique details) to 7 (recollect many unique details). such as the distinctiveness heuristic. Whereas prior work has demonstrated that perceptual factors can elicit a distinctiveness heuristic, the current experiments tested whether the distinctiveness heuristic could be elicited solely by internally generated cognitive operations. To this end, we investigated autobiographical elaboration, one of the strongest encoding tasks that could be identified in terms of its ability to enhance subsequent true recall and recognition relative to more traditional semantic processing tasks. Autobiographical elaboration requires multiple cognitive operations at study (e.g., Conway, 2005) , all of which would enhance the quality of subsequent recollections relative to semantic control tasks. We predicted that records of these cognitive operations would facilitate the use of a distinctiveness heuristic, leading to more accurate recollection-based monitoring relative to semantic judgments. Consistent with this prediction, we found that false recognition of studied lures was reduced following autobiographical elaboration tasks in four separate experiments, using different materials (trait and object words) and different semantic control tasks (valence and factory judgments).
As seen in Figure 1 , these false recognition effects were dissociated from true recognition effects. These dissociations implicate a recollection-based monitoring process that is independent from familiarity. As a strong test of familiarity accounts, in Experiments 2 and 5 familiarity for semantic items was made greater than that for autobiographical items. However, false recognition still was reduced on the autobiographical elaboration test. As discussed in Gallo et al. (2004) , familiarity-based accounts cannot easily account for these types of dissociations across experiments. According to these accounts, participants should use more conservative familiarity-based response criteria when searching memory for more familiar items, thereby yoking false recognition rates to overall differences in levels of familiarity. The dissociation of these variables across the current experiments speaks against familiarity-based explanations and instead favors a recollectionbased account, such as the distinctiveness heuristic. As discussed at the beginning of the article, there is reason to believe that both semantic judgments and autobiographical elaboration can elicit distinctive recollections (and corresponding retrieval monitoring processes), but the additional cognitive operations involved in autobiographical elaboration should result in relatively more distinctive recollections (and a more effective distinctiveness heuristic). These results therefore generalize the distinctiveness heuristic theory to a manipulation of cognitive operations.
We also gathered extensive data on the subjective experience of recollection and familiarity. With the exception of Gallo et al. (2008) , no prior study of the distinctiveness heuristic has attempted to independently measure the amount of recollective distinctiveness (qualitative differences) independently from potential differences in recollection strength (quantitative differences). These subjective results were telling. First, there was considerable agreement between our two estimates of familiarity (IRK-based subjective judgments and speeded recognition hits) both within and across the experiments. These findings support Yonelinas' (2002) contention that these measures tap into the same underlying process. Second, traditional judgments of recollection, as elicited by our modified remember-know procedure, did not uniformly track the distinctiveness differences that can be inferred from the false recognition effects. These patterns likely stem from the fact that remember-know judgments can be influenced by factors other than recollective distinctiveness, such as quantitative differences in memory, as well as contextual factors that have been uncovered in recent studies (e.g., Bodner & Lindsay, 2003; Geraci & McCabe, 2006) . Given these results, future studies should not use remember judgments as estimates of recollection-based distinctiveness.
Third, and most important to the distinctiveness heuristic theory, the subjective judgments of recollective distinctiveness did tend to track false recognition differences in predictable ways. When equated for the number of study presentations, recollection for items in the autobiographical elaboration condition was rated as significantly more distinctive than that for items in the semantic judgment conditions in both Experiments 3 and 6. These results support the idea that autobiographical elaboration involves more cognitive operations than semantic judgments, leading to greater recollective distinctiveness. Repeating semantic judgments at study eliminated this difference in Experiment 3, but that result may be attributable to the confusability of the stimuli in that experiment. When we used object words that were less confusable, a significant recollective distinctiveness advantage again was found for autobiographical items, even though items in the semantic condition were presented four times as often at study as the autobiographical items were.
Considered as a whole, these results suggest that properly constrained subjective judgments can provide an independent estimate of recollective distinctiveness. That being said, we also note that although subjective judgments can provide useful information, they are poor substitutes for objective measures. The criterial recollection task used here and elsewhere was designed to provide more objective evidence for the use of a recollection-based distinctiveness heuristic. This task allows one to more directly assess the influence of recollection-based expectations on false recognition errors. No task is process-pure, but by including controls to minimize potentially confounding strategies (such as including items in both sources to avoid a recall-to-reject process), as well as experimental manipulations to eliminate other potentially confounding variables (such as using study repetitions to overcome familiarity effects), converging evidence for the use of recollection-based monitoring processes can be obtained. Understanding the conditions that can elicit this recollection-based de- cision process is theoretically important, because participants appear to use this type of monitoring process to avoid memory distortions in a variety of tasks and situations (see Gallo, 2006) , consistent with the basic principles of the source monitoring framework (Johnson et al., 1993) .
Processes in Autobiographical Elaboration
The present study also can inform research into autobiographical memory. Although the benefit of autobiographical elaboration on true recall and recognition has been established in dozens of studies (e.g., Klein & Kihlstrom, 1986; Klein & Loftus, 1988) , ours is the first study to investigate the consequences of this encoding task on retrieval monitoring processes. The finding that false recognition was reduced when participants based their decisions on recollections of autobiographical elaboration, compared to semantic judgments, provides additional evidence that the cognitive operations involved in autobiographical elaboration can lead to distinctive recollections.
The distinctiveness of autobiographical elaboration is likely due to several processes. It may be that our autobiographical task invoked detailed imagery. Recent studies using variations of the DRM false memory task have found that visual imagery instructions during study can reduce subsequent false memories, relative to simply studying words or nonimagery based elaboration, potentially because visual imagery elicits a distinctiveness heuristic (e.g., Foley, Wozniak, & Gillum, 2006; Wiseman, 2007 ; but see Footnote 1 and related discussion in Foley et al., 2006) . Moreover, the neural signatures of remembering the past can be similar to those of imagining future scenarios (e.g., Addis et al., 2007; Byrne, Becker, & Burgess, 2007; Szpunar, Watson, & McDermott, 2007) , suggesting overlapping processes between imagination and autobiographical elaboration. Thus, it may be that imagined perceptual details contributed to the distinctiveness of autobiographical elaboration, analogous to prior studies implicating the use of a distinctiveness heuristic when studying pictures relative to words. However, semantic judgments can increase memory to a similar extent as mental imagery (e.g., Davies & Cubbage, 1976; Ghatala, 1981) , and the factory judgment task that we used in some of the present experiments may have implicitly elicited mental imagery for the object words (see Foley et al., 2006) . Given these findings and the finding that false recognition was suppressed on the autobiographical test even when our semantic judgments were repeated four times at study, an account based solely on mental imagery seems unlikely. Imagining perceptual details of autobiographical events may have contributed to our effects, but the distinctiveness of autobiographical elaboration likely depended on other cognitive operations as well.
Along these lines, Addis et al. (2007) and Daselaar et al. (2007) found that elaborating on a retrieved autobiographical memory led to increased fMRI activity in prefrontal regions compared to less elaborative autobiographical memory conditions. Such activity potentially reflected cognitive operations other than visualperceptual processing, such as effortful search, evaluative processes, and other types of self-initiated processing. It might be the memory search and elaboration process itself that is distinctive, rather than the act of experiencing a retrieved memory. Further, autobiographical elaboration also may benefit from self-referential processes (Rogers et al., 1977) , which recently have been shown to suppress false recognition in some (but not all) conditions (see Foley et al., 2006; Gunter et al., 2007) . The current studies were not designed to tease apart the specific components of autobiographical elaboration but rather to take advantage of all of these cognitive operations as a way of testing the generality of the distinctiveness heuristic theory. Additional research in this area should elucidate what makes autobiographical elaboration distinctive, as well as how different types of autobiographical memories may be more or less distinctive.
In conclusion, the current study adds to the growing literature on the distinctiveness heuristic in false recognition. Although most of these studies have used external or stimulus-driven manipulations of distinctiveness, the distinctiveness heuristic is thought to be a general monitoring strategy that can be applied in many different conditions. Along these lines, the present experiments provide some of the strongest evidence that internally generating information (i.e., cognitive operations) can enhance the effectiveness of a recollection-based distinctiveness heuristic, one that is independent from overall familiarity effects. These findings also suggest that autobiographical elaboration can be a powerful encoding mnemonic, one that involves personal memories and thus might be useful in nonlaboratory settings. By incorporating well-learned autobiographical information into the encoding of novel material, autobiographical elaboration could potentially improve the quality and accuracy of memory in individuals that otherwise have difficulty remembering.
